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In this paper we describe the important features of executive compensation in the US from 1993 to
2006. Some confirm what has been found for earlier periods and some are novel. Important facts about
compensation are that: the compensation distribution is highly skewed;  each year, a sizeable fraction
of chief executives lose money; the use of equity grants has increased; the income accruing to CEOs
from the sale of stock has increased; regardless of the measure we adopt, compensation responds strongly
to innovations in shareholder wealth; measured as dollar changes in compensation, incentives have
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In 2008 the precipitous drop in real estate prices put ﬁnancial companies’ risk–taking in the
spotlight. It is not at all surprising that, in such a climate, executive compensation came under
increased attention. Compensation was singled out as one of the most important and deeply
ﬂawed elements of the incentive system that induced ﬁrms to accumulate enormous amounts of
risk on their balance sheets. In Clementi, Cooley, Richardson, and Walter (2009) we describe
many of the ﬂawed practices in ﬁnancial ﬁrms. But executive compensation more broadly has
long been a sensitive issue and ﬁnancial crises have a tendency to focus increased attention on
it. In 1929 for example much attention was focused on the compensation of Eugene Grace, the
president of Bethlehem Steel, who faced a huge uproar when it was revealed that he received
a base salary of $12,000 and a bonus of more than $1.6 million. That amounts to $150,000
salary in 2009 dollars with a nearly $20 million bonus.
Throughout the 1930’s there was much hue and cry about executive compensation and
many proposals to cap it. The most important case in that era involved George Washington
Hill the President of American Tobacco and other senior executives. In that case several exec-
utives of American Tobacco Co. had received bonuses that plainti s claimed were excessive.
The bonuses were paid under a plan that had been approved by shareholders in the form of
a by–law adopted in 1912. The by–law provided that if the net proﬁts of American Tobacco
exceeded about $8.2 million in any year, the president of the company would receive payment
of 2.5 percent of such excess, and each of ﬁve vice–presidents would receive 1.5 percent, an ag-
gregate of 10 percent of the annual net proﬁt exceeding $8.2 million. The case eventually went
to the Supreme Court and in Rogers v. Hill (1933), the Court ruled that overall compensation
must be reasonable in proportion to the value of the services rendered. The dissenting opinion
of Judge Swan indicates the applicable rule: ”If a bonus payment has no relation to the value
of services for which it is given, it is in reality a gift in part, and the majority stockholders
have no power to give away corporate property against the protest of the minority.”
In the past two decades there has been much discussion of executive compensation, many
public examples of lavish pay, but no real consensus on the extent of the problem if indeed there
is one. In part, this is because there is a lack of clarity about what the facts are. In this paper,
we take a careful look at executive compensation in the United States in the period 1993–
2006. We investigate the cross–sectional and time–series variation in compensation, paying
particular attention to the role played by the various components of executives packages and
to the implications for incentive provision.
Our study di ers from most other contributions to the literature in that our main measure
1of compensation is the year–on–year change in the portion of executive’s wealth that is tied
to the ﬁrm. In other words, we deﬁne compensation as the sum of salary, bonus, the year–on–
year change in the value of stock and option holdings, the net revenue from the sale of stock
and exercise of options, and the value of newly awarded securities. We prefer this deﬁnition
because it aligns most closely with the concept that emerges from the analysis of multi–period
theoretical models of the relationship between managers and shareholders.
The AFL–CIO, the federation of 56 US and international labor unions,1 recently stated
that “The chief executive o cers of large U.S. companies averaged $10.8 million in total
compensation in 2006, more than 364 times the pay of the average U.S. worker, according to
the latest survey by the United for a Fair Economy.” We ﬁnd that the average compensation
of CEOs of publicly traded US companies was actually much higher than $10.8 million but the
average is wildly misleading because the compensation distribution is always highly skewed.
The median compensation in 2006 was only $4.85 million.
CEOs of large companies tend to sit on large stock and option portfolios. Accordingly,
rapid rises in their companies’ stock prices lead to handsome ﬁnancial rewards. But it also
means that they su er signiﬁcant wealth losses when those prices fall. Every year a substantial
fraction of CEOs actually lose money.
Salary and bonus payments account for a very small fraction of compensation, and their
cross–sectional dispersion is rather limited. In light of this ﬁnding, the policy debate on
capping these two components of compensation appears to be entirely misplaced.
Looking at the characteristics of compensation over time, we ﬁnd that the dollar value of
stock and option grants increased at a brisk pace for most of the 1990s. At the same time,
however, the median value of stock holdings declined. This is consistent with the ﬁnding that
during those years executives relinquished much of the stock price gains they acquired through
their compensation packages.
We estimate the sensitivity of pay to ﬁrm performance using three of the many indicators
proposed in the literature. No matter the measure considered, we ﬁnd that executives’ ﬁnancial
rewards respond strongly to innovations in shareholder wealth.
When using the methodology due to Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), we estimate that a
$1,000 increase in shareholder wealth is associated with almost a $35 rise in CEOs wealth
for the lowest–volatility companies. This is higher than the $28 estimated by Aggarwal and
Samwick (1999) for the 1993–1996 period. According to this measure, incentives have strength-
ened. However, the elasticity of CEO wealth with respect to shareholder wealth is shown to
be time–invariant at about 1.17. In light of the increase in shareholder wealth that occurred
1http://www.aﬂcio.org/corporatewatch/paywatch/pay/index.cfm
2after 1996, these ﬁndings are not inconsistent.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the data
and deﬁne our measurement conventions. In Section 3 we document the extent of separation
between ownership and control in the population of US public corporations. Section 4 char-
acterizes the most salient features of the distribution of compensation across executives. In
Section 5 we study how compensation varies with ﬁrm size and across sectors. Section 6 is
dedicated to the analysis of the time variation. The estimates of pay–performance sensitivity
are illustrated in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
2 Data and Measurement
We draw our data from the EXECUCOMP database, maintained by Standard & Poor’s.
EXECUCOMP gathers data from 1992 to the present on the compensation of up to nine
executives of all US companies whose stocks are traded on an organized exchange. The source
for the database are companies’ ﬁlings with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The
information about executives’ securities holdings and their compensation packages is contained
in the DEF14A forms (or Schedule 14A), ﬁled annually by Corporations pursuant Section 14(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
We conﬁne our attention to the years 1992 through 2006, the last (ﬁscal) year for which
we have comprehensive information. Our sample consists of information on 31,587 executives,
employed by 2,872 companies, for a total of 33,896 company–executive matches and 167,822
executive–year observations.
2.1 Measuring Compensation
It is well known that executives are compensated in a wide variety of ways. Murphy (1999)
provides a detailed description of the main components of compensation packages. Among
them are salary, bonus, stock and options grants, severance payments, 401K contributions,
and life–insurance premia.
Because of the complexity that characterizes compensation packages, deﬁning summary
measures of compensation is far from straightforward. The most common among such mea-
sures, employed by Frydman and Saks (2006) and Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) among others,
consists of the sum of salary, bonuses, long–term incentive plans, and grant–date value of se-
curities awards.2 In the remainder of the paper, we will refer to this as the classical deﬁnition
of compensation.
2See page 9 of Frydman and Saks (2006) and page 284 of Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) for their respective
deﬁnitions.
3Unfortunately the classical deﬁnition provides little information about the change in wealth
that accrues to an executive from his or her relationship with the company in a given year.
In fact, as will be clear below, the change in wealth is mostly the result of factors – such as
the change in value of stock and option holdings, and the net revenues from trade in stock –
that are not accounted for in this measure.
In this paper we consider an alternative deﬁnition of compensation, along the lines of what
was proposed by Antle and Smith (1985) and what was adopted in studies of pay–performance
sensitivity by Hall and Liebman (1998) and Aggarwal and Samwick (1999). We will refer to it
as Total Yearly Compensation. Roughly speaking, it is deﬁned as the year–on–year change in
Executive’s Wealth, which in turn consists of the expected discounted value of the portion of
executive’s wealth whose value is tied to his or her company’s performance. In the words of
Antle and Smith (1985), Total Yearly Compensation is meant to measure “the annual change
in executive’s total wealth associated with employment”.
The adoption of Total Yearly Compensation in lieu of the classical measure is motivated by
the recent literature on multi–period models of executive compensation such as Wang (1997)
and Clementi, Cooley, and Wang (2006), among others. These models explicitly acknowledge
that the utility reward an executive receives from association with the company in a given
period depends on the change in current and future consumption that takes place during
that period. This change depends on awards of securities and promises of deferred payment
received in the past, current and expected compensation packages, and on the conditional
probability of termination.
Since most securities awards are restricted, the design of current and future compensation
packages must depend on past compensation. Everything else equal, di erent stock and
options holdings will call for di erent contractual provisions both in the present and in the
future. For this reason, looking at these provisions in isolation will be misleading. That is, it
will give an inaccurate picture of the change in current and future consumption possibilities
that derive from employment by the company.
This approach is supported by anecdotal evidence from corporate communications. For
example, according to 2006 Oracle Corporation’s DEF14A, the factors considered by that
company in determining the size of option grants include “the intrinsic value of outstanding,
un–vested equity awards and the degree to which such values supports our retention goals for
each executive.”
Our ideal measure of wealth consists of the value of stock and options in the executive’s
portfolio plus the expected discounted value of all future handouts in form of cash and secu-
rities. Operationally we deﬁne it as the market value of securities holdings plus the expected
4discounted value of future salaries and bonuses. Total yearly compensation consists of the
sum of salary, bonus, the year–on–year change in the value of stock and option holdings, the
net revenue from the sale of stock and exercise of options, and the value of newly awarded
securities.
Throughout the paper, we will also consider the partition of compensation into Current
and Deferred. Current compensation includes all claims that can be instantaneously traded for
consumption goods. Deferred compensation, the residual part, consists of the current expected
value of all claims over future consumption. This partition is of particular interest because
the theoretical analysis of executive compensation in dynamic moral hazard models, implies
restrictions on the relative role the two portions play in incentive provision.
Operationally, we deﬁne Current compensation as the sum of salary, bonus, dividends, and
net revenues from trade in stock. Deferred compensation is the sum of the yearly changes in
the value of stock and options in portfolio, retirement beneﬁts, expected future salaries, and
other deferred payments.
The precise deﬁnition of all variables can be found in Appendix A. For our purposes, the
EXECUCOMP database presents two major shortcomings. To start with, EXECUCOMP only
includes the value of options that are in-the-money. This greatly complicates the estimation of
the year–on–year change in the value of option holdings. Furthermore, the database provides
no information on purchases and sales of stock by the executives. This makes it hard to come
up with an accurate measure of the net revenue from trade in stock.
We consider two alternative deﬁnitions of option holdings. The ﬁrst, which is used by
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), is simply the sum of two EXECUCOMP variables, namely the
value of the un-exercisable in–the–money options and that of the exercisable in–the–money
options, both computed at the money at the end of the ﬁscal year.3 Since it does not take into
account the value of out–of–the money options, this deﬁnition introduces an upwards bias in
the absolute value of the ﬂuctuations in options values. The alternative deﬁnition estimates
the value of out-of-the-money options by means of a simple algorithm due to Himmelberg and
Hubbard (2000). The details of the procedure are illustrated in Appendix A.1.4
By net revenue from trade in stock, we mean the di erence between the revenues from sales
of stock and the expense incurred in acquiring shares (either by purchase or option exercise).
Executives may (i) purchase and sell common stock on the open market, (ii) purchase common
3In the latest version of the database, the two variables are labeled OPT UNEX UNEX UNEXER EST VAL
and OPT UNEX UNEX EXER EST VAL, respectively. In the previous version, their names were INMOUN
and INMONEX.
4For the sake of brevity, this draft does not include the results obtained with this second method. They are
available from the authors upon request.
5stock directly from the company at prices much lower than the market’s, (iv) inherit stock5
(iii) donate stock.6 Unfortunately, we cannot track either the prices or quantities of these
transactions. Furthermore, we do not know whether the shares obtained by exercising options
are kept or sold. For this reason, we resort to a simple algorithm that allows us to estimate
the net revenue from trade using other variables provided by EXECUCOMP. The algorithm
is described in Appendix A.2.
3 Separation Between Ownership and Control
In the last thirty years or so, thousands of pages have been written on executive compensation,
both in the academic and popular press. Among the reasons for this intense interest is that
executive compensation is thought of as the most powerful tool to align the goals of owners and
managers of modern corporations. That these goals are misaligned because of the separation
between ownership and control is taken to be one of the deﬁning characteristics of public
corporations.
Since the appearance of the inﬂuential work by Berle and Means (1932), the standard
characterization conceives of executives, and CEOs in particular, as professionals hired by
shareholders to run their companies. This view takes the separation between ownership and
control, intended in its most extreme version, as a fact. However, even to the distracted
observer it should be obvious that in reality there is an enormous variation in the degree of
separation. Figure 1 substantiates this claim, by showing the cumulative distribution of CEO
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Figure 1: CEO Equity Stake in 2006.
5For example, in 1999 Carnival CEO Mickey Arison inherited stock from his father.
6Mr. Warren Bu ett, the larger shareholder and CEO Berkshire Hathaway, made several donations in stock.
6Our data shows that in 2006, about 25% of CEOs held more than 1% of their companies’
common stock, and about 10% held more than 5%.7 CEOs with relatively low stock holding
ﬁt the Berle and Means’ stereotype, in the sense that they are likely to have been hired only
to manage the company. This is the case, for example, of Mr. John W. Thompson, who
spent most of his career at IBM before being hired as Symantec’s CEO in 1999. In 2006, Mr.
Thompson held about 0.16% of the company’s common stock. The CEOs with the largest
equity stakes are far from the Berle and Means’ ideal and are likely to be either the companies’
founders or to have family ties to them. This is the case of Micky Arison, CEO of Carnival
Corporation – the world’s largest cruise operator – and son of Ted Arison, the company’s
founder. In 2006, Mr. Arison held about 23.8% of Carnival’s common stock.
As will be clear below, stocks have a primary role in incentive provision. In the case
of professional CEOs such as Symantec’s Mr. Thompson, the observed equity stake is the
result of the company’s compensation policy. Therefore, the incentives that result can be
used to assess the disciplining role of boards of directors. This is decidedly not the case for
company founders and for other executives, such as Mr. Arison, whose large equity holdings
have nothing to do with the company’s compensation policy. These individuals, although
disciplined by the requirements of public companies, essentially have absolute control over the
source of their pecuniary incentives. Compensation committees can have very little impact
on them.
In light of this simple argument, in the remainder of this paper we will report certain
statistics for Professional CEOs only, arbitrarily deﬁned as those that hold less than 1% of
their companies’ common stock. Our goal is discern the di erences, if any, in the way in which
professional CEOs are compensated and in the incentives they face.
4 The Distribution of Compensation across Executives
Figure 2 depicts the cross–sectional distributions of wealth and total compensation for the
population of CEOs in 2006. The striking feature of both histograms is the right skewness.
Median CEO pay in 2006 was only 4.85 million dollars. The exorbitant average pay of 45.7
million was mostly the result of sky–high compensation at the very top of the distribution.
Table 8 (refer to the rows labeled ”Gross”) reports a series of statistics of the compensation
distribution, for all sample years. The skewness index of 27.15 8 for 2006 was not an outlier.
Skewness has been a feature of the CEOs’ total compensation distribution throughout the
7We need to warn the reader about two caveats. On the one hand, the SEC does not require companies to
disclose equity stakes lower than 1%. This is likely to bias our measure upwards. On the other hand, we don’t
include in our measure stocks held by other family members. This will introduce a downward bias.
8By skewness index we mean the ratio of third moment about to the mean to the standard deviation.
7sample period. Notice, however, that the distribution is not always right–skewed. In the three
(ﬁscal) years following the stock market peak of January 2000, the mean CEO compensation
was largely negative, while the median values were positive. The reason is that, as illustrated
in Section 5, CEOs of large companies have relatively high stock and option holdings. In turn,
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Figure 2: CEO Compensation in 2006.
This leads us to another salient feature of the data. Contrary to what has become common
wisdom, CEOs do lose money. Sometimes, they lose a lot. In 2006, with the S&P 500 index
rising by more than 9%, our measure of compensation was negative for as many as 264 CEOs.
As expected, the big losers were those at the helm of companies whose stock dropped the most
in value during the year. Among them, Yahoo (–33%), Amazon (–20%), and Ebay(–30%).
Conversely, the winners were the chief executives of the companies whose shareholders gained
the most, such as Mc–Graw Hill (+30%), Marriott (+38%), and Comcast (+65%). Table
8 shows that a sizeable fraction of CEOs lost money in every year. In 2002, that fraction
exceeded 40%.
If executives hedge systematic risk, actual median gains and losses will be much smaller
(in absolute value) than our ﬁgures suggest. For this reason, we also report statistics for
Total Yearly Compensation, net of the return executives would have earned by investing their
wealth in the market portfolio. See the rows labeled “Net of Market” in Table 8.
The Net deﬁnition yields the actual compensation under the assumption that executives
hedge systematic risk by selling short the market portfolio or by building a similar position
by trading on derivatives.9
9An example of such a position is a zero–cost collar, which involves selling an out–of–the–money call option
8Hedging systematic risk has a large e ect on the tails of the compensation distribution. It
moderates losses in bad years for the stock market and moderates gains in good years. As a
result, median net compensation tends to be smaller than gross compensation in a good year
for the stock market, and larger in bad years. Table 8 shows that median net compensation
ranged between –$100,000 (in 1998) and $5.82 million (in 2003). The main message we draw
from these data, however, is the same as above. In every single year both dispersion and
skewness were remarkably large.
Since the SEC does not require executives to disclose trades in securities not issued by their
companies, we do not know whether executives indeed hedge market risk or not. However,
Garvey and Milbourn (2003) provides indirect evidence that this may be the case. They argue
that if companies recognize that they should use relative performance evaluation (RPE) only
for those executives that are unable to diversify systematic risk, estimates of pay–performance
sensitivity should depend on market volatility only in the case of younger and poorer execu-
tives, whose chances of diversiﬁcation are slimmer. This is exactly what they found in their
study.
Refer once more to Table 8. The third row illustrates the results that obtain with the
classical deﬁnition of compensation. The picture it conveys is rather di erent. In 2006,
mean and median CEO pay were $6.74 and $3.24 million , respectively. Interestingly, the
dispersion across executives is much lower than it is with our measure. According to the
classical deﬁnition, the mean compensation of the top 10% in the distribution was about
35 million dollars in 2006 (against our estimate of $450.33 million). The mean compensation
among the bottom 10% in 2002 was about $450,000, against a $336.86 million loss that obtains
according to our deﬁnition!
Table 9 provides detailed information about the partition of total yearly compensation
between Current and Deferred. A clear fact, better illustrated in Figure 3 in the case of 2006,
is the cross–sectional dispersion in the deferred component. Both big winners and big losers
have large stock and option portfolios. To appreciate this, consider that the median equity
stake among CEOs in the top and bottom deciles of the compensation distribution are 1.15
and 0.77%, respectively, against a 0.24% median for the remainder.
The cross–sectional dispersion of Current compensation is much lower. In 2006, the ratio
of median absolute deviation to the median is 0.76 for Current compensation, against 6.04 for
Deferred compensation. Another interesting ﬁnding, illustrated in Figure 4, is that most of the
variation in Current compensation comes from the proceeds from trade in stock. In fact, the
median absolute deviation for salary and bonus was only $270,000 (the median was $829,000).
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Figure 3: Split of Compensation in the Cross–Section
In light of this ﬁnding, the policy debate on the possibility of capping salary and/or bonuses
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Figure 4: Current Compensation in the Cross–Section.
Bebchuk and Fried (2004) argued that “... much executive compensation comes in forms
other than equity, such as salary and bonus.” and that “The evidence indicates that cash
compensation – including bonuses – has been at best weakly correlated with ﬁrms’ industry
adjusted performance.”10 The evidence presented in Section 7 is deﬁnitely in agreement with
the latter statement. But, our data do not conﬁrm the ﬁrst part of this claim. For most CEOs,
salary and bonus account for a rather small portion of total compensation. See Figures 3 and
10See page 7, lines 1 through 4.
104.
Table 10 illustrates compensation across professional CEOs. The distribution of Current
compensation is remarkably similar to that for the entire population of CEOs. At the same
time, both the median and the median absolute deviation of total compensation are smaller in
every single year. The main di erences, however, are in the means. This should not come as
a surprise. We deﬁned non–professional CEOs as those who own large equity stakes in their
companies. In turn, this implies that their total compensation will be particularly high in
good times and particularly low in bad times. This immediately leads us to wonder whether
the incentives faced by professional CEOs are as strong as previous analysis led us to believe.
We will address this question in Section 7.
Finally, Table 11 illustrates the distribution of compensation across all non–CEO exec-
utives in our data-set. Both median and median absolute deviation are considerably lower.
This is the result of lower levels of compensation in all categories, and in particular in those
that are more sensitive to ﬂuctuations in stock prices. At the margin, notice that all measures
of compensation are particularly high in the top and bottom 5% of executives, because most
company founders with no executive roles fall in these bins.
5 Compensation Variation in The Cross–Section of Firms
In this section we are interested in documenting how the various measures of compensation
vary with ﬁrm size and across sectors.
Beginning with Kostiuk (1990), many have investigated the relationship between ﬁrm
size and executive compensation. Kostiuk himself, Murphy (1999), Bebchuk and Grinstein
(2005), and Gabaix and Landier (2008) among others, found evidence of a positive correlation
between the two variables. Even in our dataset, the classical deﬁnition of compensation is
unconditionally positively correlated with proxies for size such as sales and book value of
assets. The question is whether a similar pattern holds for total compensation.
Figure 5 depicts median CEO Wealth and Total Yearly Compensation for each decile in
the distribution of book value of assets, in 2002. We have chosen 2002 because in that year
mean compensation was largely negative.
The left panel tells us that, even in a year of relatively low stock prices, CEOs of larger
ﬁrms had substantially larger wealth tied to the ﬁrms they led. In particular, they had larger
stock and option holdings. This is why, as suggested by the right panel, the same CEOs
su ered substantial losses.
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Figure 5: CEO Compensation and Firm Size.
salaries tend to be higher in larger ﬁrms, but the cross–sectional variation is minimal. Most
of the variation in Current compensation is accounted for by di erences in the net revenues
from trade in stock.
The patterns just described do not change substantially when we adopt sales rather than
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Figure 6: CEO Compensation across Sectors.
Figure 6 illustrates the variation of CEO wealth and compensation across sectors. Inter-
estingly, CEOs in the Mining and Finance Insurance and Real Estate (FIRE) sectors stand
out as holding larger wealth. Table 13 shows that for the FIRE sector this has been the case
throughout the sample period. It is not clear whether this is due to the fact that CEOs in the
FIRE sector manage larger ﬁrms. In fact, ﬁrms in the FIRE sectors tend to be larger when
size is proxied by book value of assets, but not when we use either employment or sales.
126 Compensation Over Time
Echoing the popular and business press, a number of recent papers have argued that the
level of executive compensation has increased dramatically over time. For example, Frydman
and Saks (2006) state that “The compensation of top executives increased by 6.8% per year
from 1980 to 2003.” Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) ﬁnd that “Among S&P 500 ﬁrms, average
CEO compensation climbed from $3.7 million in 1993 to $9.1 million in 2003 (an increase of
146%).”
When considering the classical deﬁnition of compensation, our study delivers a similar
message. Once again, given the skewness of the distribution, we will look at median values
rather than means. The left panel of Figure 7 shows that the median compensation has
doubled over the 14 sample–years. On average, this amounts to a growth rate which is about
4 times that of average non–farm hourly wages. Interestingly, median compensation has
also increased in years in which most companies had rather poor ﬁnancial results. This is
the evidence invoked by those observers that argue that CEOs never lose, even when their
companies’ results are negative.
When we turn to our deﬁnition of compensation, the message is di erent. The right panel
of Figure 7 illustrates the dynamics of real median compensation, both gross and net of the
return on the market portfolio. Compensation has been quite variable over the sample years.
As expected, the gross measure tracked aggregate stock market returns. Median gross
compensation was at its minimum of about 420,000 dollars in 2002, when the S&P500 index
lost about 30% of its value. In that year, 656 out of the 1,448 continuing CEOs lost money. It
reached its maximum of 8.56 millions in 2003, when the S&P500 gained about 21%. What is
clear is that there is no discernible trend. In fact, in 2005 median gross compensation turned
out to be about the same as ten years earlier.
Our net deﬁnition displays less time–series variation than gross compensation. Once again,
however, we cannot discern any particular trend.
Let’s now turn to the growth pattern of the various components of compensation. The
left panel of Figure 7 shows that the Current portion has increased over most of the sample
period, at a mean pace much faster than average non–farm hourly wages. The same graph
suggests that the growth in salaries accounts for a small portion of the increase. Indeed, the
salary of the median CEO has increased less than average wages in the non–farm sector.
It turns out that most of the post–1999 increase in Current compensation is accounted for
by net proceeds from trade in stock, i.e. by options exercise and stock sale. This piece of
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Figure 7: CEO Compensation over Time.
The right panel in Figure 8 shows that the median dollar value of securities grants has
increased over pretty much the whole sample period. The pace of the increase was most
notable until 2001. However (see left panel), median stock holdings actually declined from
1998 to 2003 (and picked up later on).
Let’s assemble the various pieces of the puzzle. At the end of 1990s, we had increasing
stock prices and security grants, but declines in the median value of both stock and option
holdings. It appears that companies stepped up the grant of securities, perhaps with the
purpose of sharpening incentives, but it looks like executives sold shares whenever they could.
Our conﬁdence in this rationalization of the facts is enhanced by the evidence provided
by Ofek and Yermack (2000), that (i) executives tend to immediately relinquish the shares
obtained via options’ exercise and that (ii) those among them that have higher equity stakes
sell stock whenever they are granted new restricted shares or new options.
The right panel in Figure 8 points to a further change in compensation practices. The
relative importance of stock and options has changed. Since 2001, stock grants have become
more prominent, as companies scaled down the volume of option awards.
Hall and Murphy (2003) argued that the increase in option grants over the 1995–2001
period was prompted by revisions to the tax code enacted in 1994. According to the new rules,
companies were allowed to deduct compensation expenses in excess of 1 million dollars, only
when the compensation was performance–based. It would be interesting to understand what
prompted companies to change their compensation practices after 2001 from using options to
stock grants.
Changes in sectoral composition don’t appear to be among the causes of this phenomenon.
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Figure 8: Dynamics of Wealth and Securities Grants.
during the sample period – Paper and Allied Products (SIC 26) and Depository Institutions
(60) – and those whose importance grew over time, such as Electronic Equipment (SIC 36),
and Business Services (73).11
7 The Sensitivity of Compensation
Another important aspect of executive compensation is its sensitivity to changes in shareholder
wealth. Scholars have assessed it in a variety of ways. Here we will consider three of them.
The ﬁrst, which we identify as JM–AS, measures the dollar increase in executive’s wealth per
$1,000 increase in shareholder wealth. The other two are the semi–elasticity and the elasticity
of executive’s wealth with respect to shareholder wealth, respectively.
The three deﬁnitions reﬂect di erent hypotheses about how shareholders and executives
value risky prospects. For example, the ﬁrst two deﬁnitions are valid only under the assump-
tion that the prospect of losing a given dollar amount has the same impact on executives, no
matter their wealth. The third is based on the postulate that what matters to executives is
the percentage change in wealth.
11The two–digit SIC sectors that shrank the most in term of relative importance also include Printing and
Publishing (27), Chemicals and Allied Products (28), Petroleum Reﬁning (29), Leather and Leather Products
(30), Primary Metal Industries (33), Transportation Equipment (37), Communications (48), Electric, Gas, and
Sanitary Services (49), Food Stores (54), and Depository Institutions (60). Among the sectors that gained the
most are Photographic, Medical, and Optical Goods (38), Insurance Carriers (63), and Holding And Other
Investment O ces (67).
157.1 The JM–AS Sensitivity Measure
The acronym JM–AS refers to the contributions by Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Aggarwal
and Samwick (1999). Having found that in their sample CEO wealth increased by only $3.25
for 1,000 dollar increase in shareholder wealth, Jensen and Murphy (1990) claimed that CEOs
were paid like bureaucrats. Or, in other words, that they faced rather weak incentives.
Schaefer (1998) and Hall and Liebman (1998) showed that Jensen and Murphy (1990)’s
estimate was low because their sample was biased towards large ﬁrms. Stock market capital-
ization ﬂuctuates more for large ﬁrms than it does for small ﬁrms. This implies that the risk
imposed on a CEO by a given pay–performance sensitivity tends to be larger, the larger the
ﬁrm.
This motivates us to follow the lead of Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), and compute esti-
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Figure 9: Compensation and Shareholder Gain.
The scatter plot in Figure 9 shows the association of changes in shareholder and executive’s
wealth over the sample period. While the unconditional correlation between the two variables
is positive, there are many instances in which CEOs end up making money at the time in
which their companies’ market values drop by billions of dollars. These are the cases in the
upper left quadrant and they are the ones that attract a lot of media attention.
As an example, consider the case of Douglas Ivester, the CEO of Coca–Cola Co. from
October 1997 to February 2000. During the 1999 ﬁscal year, Coca–Cola’s shareholders lost
about 14%, or about 22.5 billion dollars. According to our calculations,12 in the same year,
Mr. Ivester made about 74 million dollars. As a result of the fall in the company’s stock
12We reiterate that we do not have information about the actual stock sales by the executive. Our calculations
are simply approximations, based on the information included in the Schedule 14A.
16price, the value of his stock holding dropped. This explains why his Deferred compensation
was negative (about –60.65 millions). However, his Current compensation was roughly $135
million, 91 of which came from the sale of company’s stock.13
Following Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), we estimate the following equation:
wijt =  0 +  1 MKT CAPjt +  2 MKT CAPjt   F( j)+ 3F( j)+ t +  it, (1)
where i,j,t index the executive, the ﬁrm, and time, respectively. The letter w denotes com-
pensation, MKT CAPjt is total market capitalization,   is the one–period lag operator, and
 t is a year dummy whose purpose is to control for aggregate shocks. Finally,  jt denotes
the standard deviation in shareholders’ dollar return (i.e. the change in market capital-
ization). F(·) is the cumulative distribution of standard deviations. The interaction term
 MKT CAPjt   F( j) was introduced because the impact on compensation of a 1,000 dol-
lar change in shareholder wealth is expected to be larger, the smaller the average change in
capitalization. The measure of sensitivity for company j in year t will be  1 +  2   F( jt).
Our estimates are reported in Table 1.
Table 1: Median Regression Estimates of Pay–Performance Sensitivities
All Executives All CEOs Professional CEOs
Dependent Variables: Total Current Deferred Total Current Deferred Total Current Deferred
Shareholder Gain 6.803 0.686 0.966 34.630 2.015 28.868 21.317 1.475 17.522
( 0.017) ( 0.008) ( 0.012) ( 0.149) ( 0.060) ( 0.139) ( 0.133) ( 0.056) ( 0.090)
Sh Gain   Variance distrib -6.366 -0.679 -0.574 -32.704 -1.961 -27.214 -19.744 -1.414 -16.208
( 0.017) ( 0.008) ( 0.012) ( 0.151) ( 0.061) ( 0.141) ( 0.136) ( 0.057) ( 0.092)
Variance distrib 2,072.019 1,250.416 -955.392 3,471.623 3,710.679 -1,331.193 3,891.368 3,483.049 -525.600
( 16.827) ( 8.213) ( 11.706) ( 146.512) ( 59.542) ( 137.043) ( 136.235) ( 57.582) ( 92.073)
Number of observations 103,113 105,103 103,113 16,953 17,182 16,953 11,357 11,489 11,357
Pseudo R
2 0.049 0.020 0.033 0.077 0.022 0.063 0.219 0.061 0.174
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis.
In the case of CEOs, a 1,000 dollar increase in capitalization induces a $34.63 dollar
increase in compensation for the ﬁrm with the lowest volatility and a $1.93 dollar increase for
the ﬁrm with the highest. These estimates are substantially larger than those obtained by
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) for the period 1993–1996. When we restrict attention to that
period, we ﬁnd that the sensitivity of the lowest–variance ﬁrm is $25.60, slightly smaller than
the value reported by Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) ($27.596).
What explains the increase in the JM–AS measure? Can it simply be the result of a
decrease in the volatility of shareholder value?
Let’s think ﬁrst of systematic volatility. Garvey and Milbourn (2003) argue that if execu-
tives hedge systematic risk, then the magnitude of the JM–AS measure should only vary with
13The remainder of Mr. Ivester’s Current compensation in 1999 consisted of 1.5 millions in salary, and in
about 20 millions in both the EXECUCOMP variables ALLOTHPD and OTHANN.
17the idiosyncratic portion of the volatility of shareholder’s wealth. They provide evidence that
this is indeed the case between 1992 and 1998. We followed their methodology and retrieved
measures of systematic and idiosyncratic volatility by means of simple CAPM regressions.
Then, we modiﬁed equation (1) by replacing the c.d.f. of ﬁrm volatility with the distributions
of systematic and idiosyncratic volatility.
Our results are reported in Table 14. The bottom line is that the relationship between
the sensitivity measure and volatility is accounted for almost completely by the idiosyncratic
portion of the latter. This also means that changes in systematic volatility are not likely to
rationalize the increase in the sensitivity measure we have documented.
How about changes in idiosyncratic risk? Brandt, Brav, and Kumar (2009) found that
the idiosyncratic volatility of percent returns declined over the 1997–2007 period. Obviously,
this may matter. There are at least two reasons, however, why this may not be the whole
story. First of all, the volatility of shareholder wealth also depends on market valuation, which
has increased over the period in exam. Furthermore, Brandt, Brav, and Kumar (2009) argue
that most of the decline in volatility applied to a subset of stocks (low price stocks, held
proportionally more by retail investors). This means that the decline in volatility may have a
sizeable impact on OLS estimates, but should have a more limited e ect on median estimates.
The results reported so far suggest that the increase in performance–based compensation
may have led to stronger incentives. The next two sections will tell us whether our other
measures of pay–performance sensitivity yield a consistent picture.
Table 2: Sensitivity at di erent levels of volatility – Professional CEOs
Total Current Deferred
Lowest Variance 21.317 1.475 17.522
Median Variance 11.445 0.768 9.418
Largest Variance 1.573 0.061 1.314
Table 1 also reports our sensitivity estimates for all the executives and for the group of
professional CEOs, respectively. As expected, the estimates for non–CEO executives are much
lower than reported above for CEOs. The picture that emerges for professional CEOs is more
interesting. On the one hand, the sensitivity of Current compensation is about the same as for
the totality of CEOs. On the other hand, we ﬁnd that the deferred component responds much
less to ﬂuctuations in shareholder value. This is obviously due to the lower stockholding.
To determine whether the JM–AS sensitivity varies across sectors, we interact the variable
18 MKT CAPjt with sector–speciﬁc dummies. We estimate the equation
wijt =  0 +  1 MKT CAPjt    s +  2 MKT CAPjt   F( j)+ 3F( j)+ it,
where  s equals 1 if the ﬁrm j belongs to sector s and equals 0 otherwise. Table 3 reports
our estimates of the sensitivity for lowest–volatility ﬁrms. The parameter  1 is estimated to
be -18.573. There appears to be limited variation across sectors.
Table 3: JM–AS Sensitivity Coe cients by Sector – Professional CEOs
Mining Construction Manufacturing Transportation Wholesale Retail FIRE Services
20.678 23.426 19.863 19.214 19.332 20.327 20.979 22.698
Next, we follow Core and Guay (2002) and Cichello (2005) among others, and investigate
whether ﬁrm size per–se has any e ect on pay–performance sensitivity. To this end, we
augment equation (1) by interacting the gain in shareholder wealth with the c.d.f. of sales
(lagged one period). Our estimates are displayed in Table 15. As in the previous literature,
we ﬁnd that ﬁrm size does matter. That is, even conditioning on the standard deviation of
shareholders’ dollar return, the sensitivity is negatively associated to size. Our ﬁndings do
not change qualitatively when we proxy size with book value of assets.
We conclude this section by outlining a few basic issues that cast some doubts on the
reliability of these estimates and that have gone unremarked in earlier studies. We start
by observing that the decision to use the c.d.f. of the standard deviation, rather than the
standard deviation itself is not innocuous. It amounts to a concave transformation that
lowers the impact of relatively large observations and therefore increases the magnitude of the
estimates.
A second issue has to do with the ﬁt of the model. With the exception of professional
CEOs, the Pseudo R2 are very low, suggesting that the linear model model accounts for a
rather small fraction of the total variance.
Finally, we notice that the correlation between  MKT CAPjt and its interaction with
F( j) is always larger than 0.99. This is a even bigger issue when we include in the re-
gression the c.d.f. of sales or other proxies for ﬁrm size. In those scenarios, the regressor
 MKT CAPjt F(sizej) is also very highly correlated with the other two. However, in spite
of the multicollinearity, the large size of the sample ensures that the estimates are stable and
appear to be statistically signiﬁcant. These are serious issues.
197.2 The Semi–Elasticity of Compensation with Respect to Shareholder
Wealth
The semi–elasticity measures the dollar increase in executive’s wealth associated with a 1%
increase in shareholder wealth. We estimate the following equation:
wijt =  0 +  1Sh %Gainjt +  2Sh %Gainjt   F( j)+ 3F( j)+ t +  it, (2)
where Sh %Gainjt is the percentage gain of ﬁrm j’s shareholders over the ﬁscal year t. Here
 jt represents the standard deviation of shareholder percent return. F(·) is the c.d.f of the
standard deviation.
Our estimate of the expected dollar increase in total yearly compensation associated with
a 1% increase in shareholder return is  1 +  2   F( jt). The results are listed in Table 4.
Table 4: Semi–elasticity Estimates
All CEOs Professional CEOs
Dependent Variables
Shareholder Return 368.739 265.708
( 4.444) ( 3.596)
Sh Ret   Variance distrib -228.716 -202.888
( 5.780) ( 4.822)
Variance distrib 278.012 -617.408
( 254.988) ( 222.393)
No. Observations 16,953 11,357
Pseudo R
2 0.043 0.092
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis.
In the previous Section, we showed that our JM–AS sensitivity estimates over the 1993–
2006 are larger than those obtained by Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) for the 1993–1996
period. Similarly, the estimates reported in Table 4 are larger than those that we obtain by
running the same regression over data for the earlier period. When we discard post–1996 data,
the coe cients of shareholder return are 237.61 and 186.56 for CEOs and professional CEOs,
respectively.
Hall and Liebman (1998) simply regressed dollar compensation on a constant and share-
holder return. When we do the same (running robust regressions as they did), we obtain that
a 1% increase in return was associated on average with a 195,000 dollar increase in compen-
sation, an estimate considerably larger than the 43,000 dollars reported by Hall and Liebman
(1998) for the period 1980–1994.
In order to determine whether the semi–elasticity varies across sectors, we proceed to
interact the variable Sh %Gainjt with sector–speciﬁc dummies, as we did in the previous
20section. The estimate of  2 is  183.137. Table 5 reports our estimates of the sensitivity for
lowest–volatility ﬁrms.
Table 5: Semi–elasticities by Sector – Professional CEOs
Mining Construction Manufacturing Transportation Wholesale Retail FIRE Services
215.850 230.859 252.287 201.615 191.395 268.963 365.961 291.699
The FIRE sector stands out as the one displaying the highest sensitivity. However, digging
a little deeper reveals that the di erences are not as large as Table 5 may lead one to believe.
The point, very simply, is that the FIRE sector has a relatively large fraction of low–volatility
ﬁrms.
To see that this is indeed the case, consider Figure 10, which plots the frequency distribu-
tion of estimated sensitivities by sector. That is, the frequency distribution of  1+ 2 F( jt).
The middle panel on the top row shows that the FIRE sectors has a large portion of ﬁrms
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Figure 10: Distribution of sensitivity estimates.
7.3 The Elasticity of Executive’s Wealth With Respect to Shareholder
Wealth
The elasticity measures the percentage change in the portion of executive’s wealth tied to
the ﬁrm which is associated with a 1% increase in market capitalization. Since typically
non–CEOs executives have little wealth invested in the companies they work for, we focus on
21CEOs. The equation we estimate is
CEO %Gainijt =  0 +  1Sh %Gainjt +  t +  it, (3)
where CEO %Gainijt denotes the percentage increase in the wealth of CEO i in year t. Our
results are listed in Table 6.
Table 6: Elasticity Estimates
All CEOs Professional CEOs
Dependent Variables
Shareholder Return 1.175 1.304
( 0.006) ( 0.011)
Constant 0.218 0.326
( 0.015) ( 0.026)
No. Observations 19,146 12,810
Pseudo R
2 0.318 0.279
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis.
At the median, the percentage increase in CEO wealth associated with a 1% increase in
shareholder wealth is 1.17 for the totality of CEOs and 1.3 for professional CEOs. The likely
reason for this di erence is that professional CEOs tend to have less wealth invested in their
companies.
Unlike the JM–AS measure and the semi–elasticity, our estimates of the elasticity are
stable over the sample period. For the sake of consistency, let’s consider the 1993–96 period.
The point estimate for the CEOs is the same as in Table 6. The elasticity for professional
CEOs was 1.25 in the earlier period as opposed to 1.3 - di erent but not hugely so.
In light of the increase in shareholder wealth that occurred after 1996, the time variation
of our elasticity estimates is not inconsistent with the results obtained for the other two
sensitivity measures. According to Table 13, median CEO wealth was only $16.13 million in
1993 and grew to $19.29 million in 1996. In 2006, it had risen to 26.75 million, about 39%
higher. These ﬁgures lead to two possible rationalizations of the evidence.
It may be the case that what matters to executives is really the percentage ﬂuctuations in
their wealth. If this is the case, the increase in the JM–AS and semi–elasticity measures were
needed in order to maintain incentives (i.e. the elasticity) intact in the face of an increase in
shareholder wealth.
Alternatively, it may be dollar changes that matter. If so, the increase in the dollar
volatility of compensation would reﬂect a strengthening of incentives. The increase in CEO
22wealth may have been necessary in order to retain CEOs in the faceof the higher risk they are
called to bear.
When we investigate the cross–sectoral variation in elasticity, we ﬁnd that it varies from
about 1.25 for Construction and FIRE to 1.53 for Transportation. See Table 7.
Table 7: Elasticities by Sector – Professional CEOs
Mining Construction Manufacturing Transportation Wholesale Retail FIRE Services
1.466 1.239 1.343 1.535 1.409 1.266 1.256 1.287
8 Conclusion
The compensation of executives of public corporations is a compelling issue with strong polit-
ical overtones. It is compelling because economic theory tells us a lot about how to structure
contracts to align the goals of professional managers with those of the shareholders. And yet,
there is a popular perception that this is not working and that incentives are weak. Much of
this perception is based on a set of ”facts” that are not completely reﬂective of reality.
When one looks at compensation and its components in detail, a number of features stand
out. To start with, the distribution of total compensation is highly skewed so averages are
highly misleading. The dispersion of the cross–sectional distribution is also remarkable. In
every single year, a large fraction of CEOs lose money. Sometimes, they lose a lot.
Over the sample period, the use of security grants has increased. However, this has not led
to a one for one increase in the portion of executives’ wealth that is tied to their companies.
In fact, revenues from the sale of stock have also increased.
No matter how we measure it, the sensitivity of pay to performance is substantial. However,
whether the sensitivity has increased or not, crucially depends on the proxy we use. If one
believes that what matters to executives is changes in the level of compensation, then the
conclusion is that incentives are now stronger then they used to be. Instead, if what really
matters is percentage changes in wealth, then we are led to conclude that incentives did not
change over time.
23A Deﬁnitions of CEO Wealth and Total Yearly Compensation
As stated in the main body of the paper, our deﬁnition of Executive’s Wealth proxyes for the
dollar value of the executive’s wealth that is tied to the ﬁrm at the beginning of the year. It
is deﬁned as the sum of the following elements:
1. Market Value of Stock – SHROWN PRCCF, where SHROWN is the number of shares
owned at the end of the previous ﬁscal year and PRCCF is the share price at the same
date
2. Market Value of Stock Options – INMONEX+INMONUN, where INMONEX is the




5. Total value of Restricted Stock Granted – RSTKGRNT
6. Total value of Stock Options Granted – SOPTVAL
7. Expected Discounted Value of Future Cash Payments – See Appendix A.3 below
Total Yearly Compensation is our best estimate of the net increase in executive’s wealth
that occurred during the ﬁscal year, due to her relation with the company. It is deﬁned as
the sum of the following elements:
1. Salary
2. Bonus
3. Net revenue from Trade in Stock – See Appendix A.2 below
4. Dividends
5. Long–Term Incentive Payouts – ALLOTHTOT-ALLOTHPD
6. A miscellanea of items, among which payouts for cancellation of stock options, payment
for unused vacation, tax reimbursements, and signing bonuses – ALLOTHPD+OTHANN
7. Yearly change in the Market Value of Stock
248. Yearly change in the Market Value of Options
The ﬁrst six elements deﬁne what we call Current Compensation. The sum of the remaining
ones identify Deferred Compensation.
A.1 The Value of Option Holdings according to the HH Algorithm
The analysis carried out in the main body of the paper posits that the change in the value of
the executive’s option holdings equals the year–on–year change in the sum of un-exercisable
and in–the–money options, both computed at the money at the end of the ﬁscal year. This is
strategy followed by most other studies, among which Aggarwal and Samwick (1999).
In this section we describe the algorithm devised by Himmelberg and Hubbard (2000)
in order to estimate the value of out–of–the–money options in executives’ portfolios. The
algorithm makes use of the following EXECUCOMP variables:14
• UEXNUMEX = number or un-exercised but exercisable options held by the executive
at year–end, both in–the–money and out–of–the–money
• UEXNUMUN = number of un-exercisable un-exercised options held by the executive at
year–end, both in–the–money and out–of–the–money
• SOPTEXSH = number of options exercised by the executive during the ﬁscal year
• SOPTGRN = total number of stock options awarded during the ﬁscal year
• SOPTVAL = total value of options granted during the ﬁscal year
Under the assumption that none of the options awarded in a given year are immediately
exercisable, the total value of options at year–end is the sum of (i) the value of newly granted
options (SOPTVAL), (ii) the value of un–exercisable options (in number UEXNUMUNt  
SOPTGRNt), and (iii) the value of exercisable options (in number UEXNUMEXt).
Unfortunately we lack data on strike prices and vesting horizons of the options in portfolio.
Therefore we assume that (i) a stock option grant vests gradually over four years, at a constant
rate and (ii) SOPTEXSH includes the options that are let expire. It follows that the laws of
14Some of the variables have changed labels in the latest version of the EXECUCOMP dataset.
UEXNUMEX is now called OPT UNEX EXER NUM. UEXNUMUN is OPT UNEX UNEXER NUM. OP-
TION EXER NUM. SOPTEXSH is OPTION EXER NUM. SOPTGRNT is OPTION AWARDS NUM. Fi-
nally, OPTION AWARDS RPT VALUE coincides with SOPTVAL. However, the latest version of the dataset
uses OPTION AWARDS FV for those records that follow the new FASB123 reporting requirements.
25motion for the stocks of un–exercisable and exercisable options are
UEXNUMUNt = (1   0.25)UEXNUMUNt 1 + SOPTGRNTt
UEXNUMEXt =0 .25   UEXNUMUNt 1 + UEXNUMEXt 1   SOPTEXSHt.
Then, we compute the value of the executive’s option portfolio to be
opvtt = SOPTV ALt +UEXNUMEXt  bsvext +[0.75 UEXNUMUNt 1] bsvunt. (4)
The second addendum is the value of the exercisable options. The third addendum is the value
of un-exercisable options inherited from the past.15 We need to determine UEXNUMUNt 1.
Without it, we would have to discard one more observation for every executive–ﬁrm match.
The above conditions imply that
UEXNUMUNt 1 =[ UEXNUMUNt   SOPTGRNTt]/0.75
UEXNUMEXt 1 = UEXNUMEXt + SOPTEXSHt   0.25   UEXNUMUNt 1.
Notice that, implicit in this formulation, is the fact thatUEXNUMEXt and UEXNUMUNt 1
are computed at some average price, in spite of the fact that they have di erent maturities
(and therefore di erent risk–free rates) and di erent strike prices.
A.1.1 Option Pricing
Options awarded to executives are American options on dividend–paying securities. Since
there is no closed form pricing formula for them, we will use the Black–Scholes formula for
European options with continuous payment of the underlying:
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It is left to specify how we determine the volatility of stock returns  , the dividend yield
q, the risk–free rate r, and the strike prices.
• EXECUCOMP provides data for   in the variable BS V OLAT. Since it has many
missing observation, we computed our own measure, based on CRSP data. If pt is stock
price and dt is dividend, the return is computed as log
pt+dt
adj pt 1. The factor adj is equal
to CFACSHRt/CFACSHRt 1.
15Notice that stock splits imply a slight modiﬁcation to this formula. See Appendix A.1.1 below.
26• EXECUCOMP provides data for q in the variable BS Y IELD. Since it has many
missing observation, we computed our own measure, based on CRSP data. That is,
q = log(1 + d/p).
• Risk–free rates come from FRED at the St. Louis Fed. We use monthly data, as I
follow the convention that we evaluate everything at the end of the ﬁscal year – not
the calendar year. The series are GS3 and GS5 (Monthly returns on 3– and 5–year
Treasuries – Constant Maturity).
• Following Himmelberg and Hubbard (2000) once again, we assume that
– out of the exercisable options (UEXNUMEXt), 10% are 1–year old, 30% are 2–
year old, and 60% are 3–year old. This implies a strike price for the representative
option of .1pt 1 + .3pt 2 + .6pt 3. The average maturity is assumed to be 3 years
– out of the un-exercisable options (UEXNUMUNt 1), 60% are 1–year old, 30% are
2–year old, and 10% are 3–year old. This implies a strike price for the representative
option of .6pt 1 + .3pt 2 + .1pt 3. The average maturity is assumed to be 5 years.
One last caveat about stock splits. When evaluating options, we need to exercise some
care in order to make sure that strike prices and current prices are comparable. We decide to
use the market price for current price and adjust the strike prices and the number of options
for splits.
If the split is Z shares per each owned (in terms of EXECU variables, Z = AJEXt 1/AJEXt),
we need to introduce only two minor alterations: (i) the strike price is by Z and (ii) the equa-
tion (4) becomes
opvtt = BLKV ALUEt+UEXNUMEXt bsvext+[0.75 Z  UEXNUMUNt 1] bsvunt.
A.2 Computation of the net revenue from trade in stock
In this appendix, we brieﬂy describe the algorithm we employ to estimate the net revenue
from trade in stock. We start by estimating the cost of exercising options, i.e. V EXt. We
postulate that all options exercised had the same strike price and were exercised when the
stock price was the maximum for the ﬁscal year. This amounts to assuming that the following
relationship holds:
SOPTEXER =[ MAX PRICE   STRIKE]   SOPTEXSH,
where MAX PRICE is the maximum price for the ﬁscal year and the EXECUCOMP vari-
ables SOPTEXER and SOPTEXESH are the net value realized from exercising options and
27the number of options exercised, respectively.16STRIKE is our unknown, the estimated strike
price for the options exercised during the year.17 Then CEXt, the cost of exercising the op-
tions, is given by
CEXt = SOPTEXSHt   STRIKEt.
Next, we estimate the net number of shares sold. EXECUCOMP provides us with the hold-
ings of restricted stock, RSTKHLD. The restricted stock granted GRNTt can be estimated
by dividing the value of restricted stock granted by the price at the end of the ﬁscal year:
GRNTt = RSTKGRNT/PRCCF. The law of motion for restricted stock allows us to recover
the number of vested shares V ESTt.
RSTKHLDt = RSTKHLDt 1 + GRNTt   V ESTt.
Abstracting from donations, the law of motion for common stock SHROWNt is given by
SHROWNt = SHROWNt 1 + Pt + V ESTt   St + SOPTEXSHt,
where Pt and St denote the stock purchased and sold, respectively. Our estimate of the net
number of shares sold is
St   Pt = SHROWNt 1   SHROWNt + V ESTt + SOPTEXSHt.
If Pt St > 0, we assume that the net revenue from stock trade is identically zero. If St Pt > 0,
we assume that the net revenue from stock trade is max[0,AV G PRICE (St Pt) CEXt].
That is, we assume that the executive sold St   Pt shares at the average market price for the
year, but we impose that the net revenue is always non–negative.
A.3 Expected Discounted Value of Future Cash Payments
Estimating the expected discounted value of future cash payments is extremely challenging,
as it entails (i) projecting the evolution of expected cash payments over time, (ii) estimating
the conditional expectation of years left in o ce, and (iii) conjecture a discount rate.
The evidence shown in the main body of the paper indicates that the sum of salaries
and bonuses has increased very little over our sample period. For this reason, we do not feel
particularly uncomfortable assuming that such payments are expected to stay constant at the
current value, in real terms.
16Notice that from the database it is not possible to tell whether the stock the executive acquires by exercising
options was sold or held on to.
17According to the EXECUCOMP manual, SOPTEXER is computed using the price of the day of the
exercise. This implies that our procedure over–estimates the strike price. Alternatively, we may assume that
the option was exercised when the stock price was equal to the average for the ﬁscal year.
28We ﬁnd that in our sample the hazard rate varies very little for the ﬁrst ten years in o ce.
For this reason, we make the drastic choice of assuming that the hazard rate is constant at its
sample mean of 0.1156. This ﬁgure implies that the expected number of years in charge after
the current one, is constant and equal to about 7 and a half. It is clear that this assumption
is going to bias our estimates upwards. Finally, we assume that the discount factor is 0.9615,
the value commonly used in the macroeconomics literature.
Let   be the survival rate (1 minus the hazard rate) and let   be the discount factor.
Given our assumptions, the expected discounted value of future cash payments is estimated
to equal payments in the current year, multiplied by the following factor:
(1    )
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B More Details on the Data
E ects of FAS 123. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has mandated all
public companies registrants that are not small business ﬁlers to apply Statement 123R by
the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), as of the start of their ﬁrst annual period
beginning after June 15, 2005. FAS 123R prescribes that equity based compensation has to
be expensed and be reﬂected in the ﬁnancial statements based on fair value of the awards.
This policy change had a minor e ect on the deﬁnitions of EXECUCOMP’s variables. The
conventions adopted in order to bridge variables whose deﬁnitions have changed, are available
from the authors upon request.
Dating Convention. All compensation data refers to the date of the annual shareholder
meeting, which is held within three months of the end of the ﬁscal year. We don’t have
information about meetings’ dates. Therefore we assume that the information refers to the
last day of the ﬁscal year.
Market Return. Our proxy for market return is the variable VWRETD from CRSP,
the Center for Research in Security Prices at the Booth School of Business. VWRETD is the
value–weighted return (with dividends) on an index drawn from the combined NYSE/AMEX
and NASDAQ data.
Volatility of Dollar Returns. When computing the JM–AS measure of pay–performance
sensitivity in Section 7, we include among the regressors the (c.d.f. of the ) volatility of dollar
return to shareholders. We follow Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) (see page 76 of their paper)
and deﬁne volatility in a given month as the standard deviation of the monthly total returns
to shareholders over the 60 previous months.
29Idiosyncratic Volatility of Dollar Returns. We compute idiosyncratic and systematic
volatility following the methodology described in Garvey and Milbourn (2003). For every
month, we run simple CAPM regressions over the preceding 60 month. Systematic volatility
is equal to the portion of return volatility that is explained by the model, multiplied by market
capitalization. Idiosyncratic volatility is the portion of return volatility not explained by the
model, multiplied by market capitalization.
Inﬂation Adjustment. All dollar–denominated variables in EXECUCOMP are reported
in current prices. We transformed them in constant (2005) prices, dividing them by the chain–
weighted CPI (All Urban Consumers, US City Average, All Items) from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
Wages. Average non–farm hourly wages is the series produced by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics bearing the same name, deﬂated by the CPI.
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31Table 8: Distribution of Total Compensation – Millions of 2005 dollars – All CEOs
Year Obs. Mean Median MAD Skewness Means by Decile
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1993 715 Gross 21.57 3.09 2.95 11.50 -59.15 -0.20 0.82 1.50 2.42 3.98 5.96 10.12 21.05 230.30
Net of Mkt 14.98 2.50 3.03 10.06 -80.57 -1.45 0.47 1.13 1.97 3.27 5.14 8.77 17.81 193.83
Classical 2.55 1.60 0.82 5.21 0.42 0.72 0.94 1.19 1.44 1.81 2.27 2.91 4.07 9.76
1994 1,334 Gross 5.46 1.01 2.34 17.45 -46.18 -4.25 -0.75 0.31 0.74 1.37 2.28 4.00 8.04 89.28
Net of Mkt 4.60 0.92 2.39 18.92 -47.77 -4.58 -0.94 0.26 0.69 1.26 2.14 3.85 7.63 83.75
Classical 2.67 1.57 0.87 4.69 0.38 0.64 0.85 1.13 1.41 1.78 2.25 3.05 4.38 10.90
1995 1,401 Gross 30.70 3.81 3.71 20.95 -13.62 -0.18 0.85 1.69 2.92 4.83 7.67 13.24 24.85 265.00
Net of Mkt 14.29 1.80 3.72 19.85 -47.67 -5.32 -0.49 0.58 1.30 2.50 4.38 7.87 15.05 165.40
Classical 2.79 1.62 0.88 8.50 0.39 0.68 0.90 1.14 1.45 1.83 2.33 3.17 4.67 11.33
1996 1,439 Gross 24.15 3.56 3.91 19.69 -24.86 -0.64 0.72 1.51 2.76 4.51 7.54 12.14 23.54 215.43
Net of Mkt 7.67 1.58 4.03 -0.84 -79.48 -5.19 -0.76 0.52 1.22 2.33 4.43 7.88 15.35 130.58
Classical 3.71 1.90 1.11 16.62 0.41 0.72 1.01 1.30 1.70 2.16 2.82 3.91 5.93 17.16
1997 1,432 Gross 53.70 6.67 6.41 29.18 -41.76 0.15 1.45 3.02 5.23 8.35 13.28 22.08 41.05 484.88
Net of Mkt 23.89 2.99 5.74 26.14 -111.43 -5.82 -0.61 0.86 2.08 4.01 6.96 12.71 24.05 306.69
Classical 4.51 2.27 1.38 8.71 0.45 0.81 1.15 1.52 1.98 2.55 3.33 4.64 6.93 21.79
1998 1,438 Gross 70.15 1.68 6.42 23.40 -65.21 -7.54 -2.26 -0.03 1.06 2.56 5.76 12.94 34.93 723.01
Net of Mkt 34.31 -0.10 7.29 23.38 -129.31 -19.09 -8.74 -3.77 -0.92 0.43 1.77 5.81 19.56 478.71
Classical 5.30 2.32 1.41 28.30 0.43 0.85 1.19 1.59 2.05 2.66 3.57 4.97 7.59 28.18
1999 1,485 Gross 98.45 1.74 6.64 24.95 -177.03 -8.35 -2.18 0.14 1.11 2.67 6.57 14.45 37.96 1,112.32
Net of Mkt 66.58 0.49 7.75 23.60 -281.30 -18.04 -6.73 -1.98 0.02 1.05 3.34 9.43 27.55 932.43
Classical 5.87 2.51 1.58 8.57 0.43 0.89 1.24 1.66 2.21 2.92 4.01 5.81 9.12 30.58
2000 1,430 Gross -12.38 4.12 8.39 -29.32 -525.47 -8.15 -0.65 1.05 2.89 5.87 10.85 20.81 46.95 322.08
Net of Mkt 1.89 4.88 8.69 -23.27 -451.67 -5.73 -0.04 1.45 3.51 6.79 12.85 23.49 52.01 375.98
Classical 7.47 2.74 1.84 16.19 0.41 0.84 1.25 1.70 2.29 3.16 4.38 6.12 10.43 44.22
2001 1,396 Gross -2.00 2.08 6.26 14.37 -339.37 -12.21 -2.17 0.47 1.52 3.02 5.82 10.69 20.87 291.31
Net of Mkt 23.09 3.62 6.01 20.34 -218.16 -5.33 0.15 1.47 2.76 4.99 8.51 14.90 29.31 393.06
Classical 6.93 2.78 1.94 12.95 0.42 0.84 1.25 1.73 2.38 3.31 4.74 6.95 11.49 36.32
2002 1,448 Gross -20.90 0.43 4.81 -24.79 -336.86 -15.63 -5.42 -1.55 0.02 0.91 2.32 4.71 9.92 131.62
Net of Mkt 12.12 2.46 4.79 -11.11 -173.41 -4.71 -0.47 0.74 1.83 3.26 5.82 10.58 20.55 257.30
Classical 5.26 2.81 1.83 5.52 0.45 0.90 1.30 1.79 2.43 3.25 4.41 6.10 9.43 22.55
2003 1,522 Gross 35.02 8.56 7.14 13.17 -28.12 1.37 2.94 4.82 7.18 10.66 15.53 24.53 44.57 267.06
Net of Mkt 12.63 5.82 5.42 -14.61 -95.12 0.07 1.42 2.79 4.58 7.05 10.70 16.96 31.42 146.65
Classical 4.83 2.68 1.67 3.86 0.46 0.90 1.30 1.79 2.33 3.07 4.02 5.69 8.56 20.17
2004 1,517 Gross 28.85 6.54 6.51 13.48 -36.84 -0.70 1.39 2.90 5.10 8.01 12.03 18.55 32.99 246.01
Net of Mkt 19.19 5.07 6.00 11.40 -57.45 -2.13 0.70 2.14 3.88 6.50 10.03 15.55 27.26 185.79
Classical 5.31 3.10 1.96 5.71 0.50 1.01 1.55 2.09 2.74 3.56 4.70 6.27 9.37 21.36
2005 1,529 Gross 18.47 3.91 5.07 11.67 -45.81 -2.91 0.28 1.40 2.95 4.98 8.05 14.15 27.00 175.34
Net of Mkt 14.32 3.28 5.05 6.30 -64.34 -4.19 -0.09 1.05 2.43 4.31 7.25 12.74 24.74 159.84
Classical 5.42 3.16 1.97 4.06 0.53 1.05 1.53 2.08 2.79 3.65 4.63 6.21 9.37 22.33
2006 1,428 Gross 45.70 4.85 5.58 27.15 -60.11 -1.35 0.76 1.92 3.66 6.18 10.14 16.94 30.66 450.33
Net of Mkt 31.55 3.04 5.55 29.90 -104.94 -4.65 -0.50 0.87 2.15 4.08 7.14 13.08 23.35 375.72
Classical 6.74 3.24 2.00 38.53 0.54 1.07 1.49 2.07 2.80 3.64 4.73 6.44 9.54 35.15
Note: The heading Gross denotes Total Yearly Compensation.
Net of Mkt denotes Total Yearly Compensation, net of the return on the market portfolio.
MAD stands for Median Absolute Deviation.
Skewness is the ratio of third moment about to the mean to the standard deviation.
32Table 9: Distribution of Yearly Compensation – Millions of 2005 dollars – All CEOs
Year Obs. Mean Median MAD Skewness Means by Decile of Total Compensation
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1993 715 Total 21.57 3.09 2.95 11.50 -59.15 -0.20 0.82 1.50 2.42 3.98 5.96 10.12 21.05 230.30
Current 4.50 1.33 0.70 17.81 12.42 1.54 1.10 1.51 1.63 2.44 2.47 4.49 6.06 5.70
Deferred 15.62 0.92 2.75 11.52 -71.57 -1.74 -0.28 -0.02 0.79 1.55 3.48 5.63 15.00 204.30
1994 1,334 Total 5.46 1.01 2.34 17.45 -46.18 -4.25 -0.75 0.31 0.74 1.37 2.28 4.00 8.04 89.28
Current 6.43 1.40 0.78 31.19 30.97 4.52 1.77 1.04 1.43 1.56 2.07 3.84 3.78 10.67
Deferred -1.31 -0.14 2.26 -1.67 -77.15 -8.77 -2.52 -0.74 -0.69 -0.19 0.21 0.16 4.26 72.40
1995 1,401 Total 30.70 3.81 3.71 20.95 -13.62 -0.18 0.85 1.69 2.92 4.83 7.67 13.24 24.85 265.00
Current 5.41 1.46 0.81 19.81 3.25 1.50 0.83 1.22 1.79 2.11 2.48 4.87 9.57 19.85
Deferred 25.09 1.88 3.30 21.22 -16.87 -1.68 0.02 0.48 1.13 2.72 5.19 8.38 15.28 236.49
1996 1,439 Total 24.15 3.56 3.91 19.69 -24.86 -0.64 0.72 1.51 2.76 4.51 7.54 12.14 23.54 215.43
Current 5.22 1.51 0.86 8.85 6.02 1.52 1.11 1.41 1.78 2.38 3.74 6.39 7.45 15.74
Deferred 18.74 1.44 3.56 20.34 -30.88 -2.17 -0.39 0.10 0.98 2.13 3.80 5.75 16.09 192.96
1997 1,432 Total 53.70 6.67 6.41 29.18 -41.76 0.15 1.45 3.02 5.23 8.35 13.28 22.08 41.05 484.88
Current 11.68 1.88 1.16 19.17 21.96 1.01 1.24 2.00 3.09 3.70 4.66 6.49 8.59 44.34
Deferred 41.39 3.43 5.31 28.81 -63.71 -0.85 0.21 1.02 2.14 4.65 8.62 15.59 32.46 414.39
1998 1,438 Total 70.15 1.68 6.42 23.40 -65.21 -7.54 -2.26 -0.03 1.06 2.56 5.76 12.94 34.93 723.01
Current 14.51 1.76 1.10 20.65 6.81 3.20 2.33 1.37 1.39 3.83 3.06 5.41 10.14 67.46
Deferred 54.64 -0.01 5.92 22.86 -72.02 -10.74 -4.59 -1.40 -0.33 -1.28 2.70 7.53 24.79 604.78
1999 1,485 Total 98.45 1.74 6.64 24.95 -177.03 -8.35 -2.18 0.14 1.11 2.67 6.57 14.45 37.96 1,112.32
Current 28.05 1.76 1.12 38.83 33.35 3.22 2.61 1.73 1.94 2.31 5.04 7.51 11.83 133.83
Deferred 68.47 0.02 6.65 29.00 -210.38 -11.57 -4.78 -1.59 -0.83 0.37 1.53 6.94 26.13 881.22
2000 1,430 Total -12.38 4.12 8.39 -29.32 -525.47 -8.15 -0.65 1.05 2.89 5.87 10.85 20.81 46.95 322.08
Current 11.74 1.92 1.28 21.45 25.01 4.38 1.76 2.10 1.97 3.30 5.22 7.21 13.13 33.44
Deferred -24.96 1.36 8.02 -29.84 -550.48 -12.54 -2.41 -1.05 0.92 2.57 5.63 13.61 33.82 260.29
2001 1,396 Total -2.00 2.08 6.26 14.37 -339.37 -12.21 -2.17 0.47 1.52 3.02 5.82 10.69 20.87 291.31
Current 10.07 1.97 1.29 15.85 26.56 6.56 4.48 1.76 2.10 2.64 4.62 5.49 7.92 25.45
Deferred -12.81 0.23 5.94 14.03 -365.94 -18.77 -6.65 -1.29 -0.58 0.38 1.21 5.20 12.95 245.10
2002 1,448 Total -20.90 0.43 4.81 -24.79 -336.86 -15.63 -5.42 -1.55 0.02 0.91 2.32 4.71 9.92 131.62
Current 7.16 1.93 1.27 11.51 22.78 5.77 4.00 2.99 1.89 1.62 2.74 4.67 7.41 13.06
Deferred -28.51 -1.58 4.60 -24.43 -359.64 -21.40 -9.42 -4.54 -1.87 -0.71 -0.42 0.04 2.51 109.19
2003 1,522 Total 35.02 8.56 7.14 13.17 -28.12 1.37 2.94 4.82 7.18 10.66 15.53 24.53 44.57 267.06
Current 12.10 2.08 1.34 16.97 21.62 1.14 1.61 2.42 2.75 3.82 4.95 7.29 11.64 47.85
Deferred 22.46 5.19 5.22 6.98 -49.74 0.23 1.33 2.40 4.43 6.83 10.57 17.24 32.93 198.63
2004 1,517 Total 28.85 6.54 6.51 13.48 -36.84 -0.70 1.39 2.90 5.10 8.01 12.03 18.55 32.99 246.01
Current 12.94 2.49 1.65 14.06 8.69 2.44 2.34 2.42 3.21 3.79 6.63 9.32 14.02 54.88
Deferred 15.35 2.35 5.49 13.82 -45.53 -3.14 -0.95 0.48 1.89 4.23 5.40 9.23 18.97 163.51
2005 1,529 Total 18.47 3.91 5.07 11.67 -45.81 -2.91 0.28 1.40 2.95 4.98 8.05 14.15 27.00 175.34
Current 23.01 2.49 1.70 37.77 28.25 4.64 1.54 3.49 3.07 4.88 5.15 6.84 11.51 120.63
Deferred -5.40 0.48 4.92 -32.40 -74.05 -7.55 -1.27 -2.08 -0.12 0.10 2.90 7.31 15.49 4.99
2006 1,428 Total 45.70 4.85 5.58 27.15 -60.11 -1.35 0.76 1.92 3.66 6.18 10.14 16.94 30.66 450.33
Current 22.09 2.08 1.51 36.05 16.46 2.79 3.32 2.09 3.27 4.08 6.29 12.50 17.50 89.92
Deferred 21.65 0.85 5.13 30.51 -76.57 -4.14 -2.56 -0.16 0.39 2.10 3.85 4.44 13.15 277.16
Note: MAD stands for Median Absolute Deviation.
Skewness is the ratio of third moment about to the mean to the standard deviation.
33Table 10: Distribution of Yearly Compensation – Millions of 2005 dollars – Professional CEOs
Year Obs. Mean Median MAD Skewness Means by Decile of Total Compensation
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1993 472 Total 4.64 2.36 1.82 2.19 -5.25 0.46 1.00 1.48 2.03 2.90 4.06 5.45 8.94 25.50
Current 2.49 1.33 0.65 7.16 2.80 1.19 1.01 1.44 1.73 1.73 2.78 2.71 4.86 2.86
Deferred 1.66 0.63 1.21 0.87 -8.05 -0.73 -0.01 0.04 0.31 1.16 1.28 2.74 4.08 15.83
1994 832 Total 2.17 1.12 1.12 -0.09 -7.24 -0.42 0.31 0.62 0.93 1.41 2.02 3.09 5.19 15.80
Current 2.34 1.29 0.64 7.04 3.25 1.35 0.89 0.95 1.15 1.52 1.90 2.65 3.76 4.64
Deferred -0.23 -0.01 0.97 -1.76 -10.49 -1.77 -0.58 -0.33 -0.21 -0.11 0.12 0.43 1.43 9.22
1995 889 Total 8.21 2.99 2.47 9.62 -2.25 0.53 1.01 1.64 2.45 3.75 5.63 9.30 16.42 43.97
Current 2.64 1.34 0.68 11.08 1.77 0.71 0.92 1.21 1.53 1.78 2.07 3.33 4.76 6.37
Deferred 5.50 1.36 1.91 10.39 -4.02 -0.17 0.08 0.43 0.93 1.97 3.56 5.97 11.66 34.90
1996 920 Total 7.24 3.04 2.61 6.62 -6.16 0.41 0.90 1.55 2.38 3.76 5.68 8.86 13.57 41.48
Current 2.80 1.39 0.71 7.23 1.82 0.79 1.03 1.29 1.66 2.01 2.44 3.16 5.65 6.20
Deferred 4.36 1.20 1.95 6.52 -7.98 -0.38 -0.13 0.26 0.72 1.75 3.24 5.70 7.92 32.53
1997 928 Total 12.86 5.17 4.42 5.96 -6.15 0.72 1.54 2.63 4.25 6.37 9.46 14.70 25.64 69.89
Current 4.47 1.73 0.97 13.39 2.68 0.88 1.24 1.76 2.37 3.51 4.09 4.94 7.51 11.21
Deferred 8.19 2.51 3.15 6.32 -8.83 -0.16 0.30 0.87 1.88 2.86 5.37 9.76 18.13 52.01
1998 927 Total 11.78 1.60 3.56 6.95 -22.80 -3.41 -0.61 0.41 1.12 2.15 4.17 8.60 19.93 108.93
Current 5.43 1.71 0.98 19.17 4.28 3.19 1.61 1.03 1.50 2.08 4.96 3.85 6.44 16.33
Deferred 6.02 0.02 3.30 4.05 -27.08 -6.61 -2.23 -0.62 -0.38 0.07 -0.80 4.75 13.48 80.10
1999 941 Total 17.87 1.53 3.84 14.08 -25.05 -3.62 -0.49 0.47 1.11 2.20 4.32 8.84 22.66 168.48
Current 5.64 1.68 0.99 7.72 4.93 2.97 1.90 0.99 1.46 2.04 2.59 4.37 7.95 17.47
Deferred 11.94 0.04 3.78 15.35 -29.98 -6.59 -2.39 -0.52 -0.35 0.16 1.73 4.47 14.70 138.51
2000 911 Total 11.71 3.26 5.18 3.79 -76.31 -3.25 0.21 1.18 2.60 4.58 7.91 13.97 27.72 138.71
Current 10.03 1.86 1.13 24.70 13.50 3.37 1.09 1.28 1.69 2.83 4.29 5.44 10.05 34.68
Deferred 1.04 0.97 4.93 -4.34 -89.81 -6.62 -0.88 -0.10 0.91 1.75 3.62 8.53 17.66 75.44
2001 922 Total 19.10 1.79 3.91 29.93 -76.49 -5.99 -0.83 0.70 1.46 2.48 4.29 7.25 12.87 245.85
Current 6.37 1.85 1.11 18.98 14.64 5.39 2.12 1.17 2.32 2.57 2.93 4.97 6.81 13.32
Deferred 12.24 0.16 3.76 29.83 -91.14 -11.39 -2.96 -0.46 -0.86 -0.10 1.35 2.27 6.06 220.23
2002 997 Total -21.27 0.54 3.16 -31.41 -237.55 -8.43 -2.75 -0.69 0.25 0.92 2.05 3.71 7.04 21.39
Current 4.41 1.88 1.17 17.52 8.35 4.58 2.89 2.20 1.69 1.50 2.31 3.36 4.97 8.38
Deferred -25.95 -1.15 2.87 -31.41 -245.90 -13.01 -5.64 -2.88 -1.44 -0.57 -0.26 0.36 2.07 6.36
2003 1,075 Total 16.56 6.93 5.35 9.54 -1.72 1.35 2.62 4.04 5.88 8.26 11.60 17.04 27.15 89.72
Current 6.55 2.06 1.27 19.72 2.16 1.04 1.48 1.93 2.89 3.40 4.19 5.80 8.09 25.21
Deferred 9.78 3.94 3.80 -5.11 -3.88 0.31 1.15 2.12 2.99 4.86 7.41 11.24 19.07 52.71
2004 1,069 Total 12.60 5.05 4.81 14.57 -9.76 -0.11 1.35 2.52 4.05 6.56 9.59 14.47 22.36 75.46
Current 7.79 2.46 1.54 27.98 5.84 2.03 1.83 2.18 2.92 3.40 4.93 8.12 9.79 25.91
Deferred 4.47 1.94 4.09 -1.56 -15.60 -2.14 -0.47 0.34 1.13 3.16 4.66 6.35 12.58 34.95
2005 1,103 Total 9.16 3.64 3.83 8.72 -18.72 -0.95 0.62 1.54 2.83 4.45 6.68 10.74 18.95 65.61
Current 8.79 2.41 1.57 31.85 11.18 2.73 1.77 4.09 2.87 5.50 4.85 5.87 9.84 28.91
Deferred 0.04 0.44 3.56 -24.36 -29.90 -3.67 -1.15 -2.55 -0.03 -1.05 1.83 4.87 9.11 22.99
2006 1,045 Total 13.04 4.37 4.53 21.75 -20.38 -0.37 0.89 1.91 3.27 5.45 8.78 14.30 23.93 92.95
Current 11.64 2.04 1.44 22.91 8.31 2.58 1.60 2.12 3.13 4.05 6.44 9.12 23.76 34.36
Deferred 0.42 0.69 3.80 -6.65 -28.69 -2.95 -0.71 -0.22 0.13 1.40 2.34 5.18 0.17 27.56
Note: Professional CEOs are those whose equity stake is less than 1%
MAD stands for Median Absolute Deviation.
Skewness is the ratio of third moment about to the mean to the standard deviation.
34Table 11: Distribution of Yearly Compensation – Millions of 2005 dollars – Non–CEOs
Year Obs. Mean Median MAD Skewness Means by Decile of Total Compensation
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1993 4,601 Total 3.98 0.90 0.64 36.13 -3.20 0.25 0.39 0.56 0.77 1.07 1.53 2.36 4.31 31.74
Current 1.07 0.45 0.21 27.44 1.91 0.29 0.44 0.51 0.61 0.75 0.96 1.23 1.73 1.20
Deferred 2.48 0.20 0.42 35.21 -5.11 -0.04 -0.05 0.05 0.16 0.32 0.57 1.13 2.58 25.18
1994 6,993 Total 1.14 0.52 0.41 12.32 -6.12 -0.02 0.21 0.32 0.45 0.61 0.85 1.29 2.22 11.60
Current 0.97 0.45 0.22 15.71 2.26 0.54 0.34 0.39 0.47 0.68 0.78 0.99 1.40 1.21
Deferred 0.02 0.01 0.32 8.79 -8.39 -0.56 -0.13 -0.07 -0.03 -0.08 0.07 0.29 0.82 8.30
1995 7,243 Total 3.98 0.97 0.73 30.71 -1.86 0.24 0.37 0.55 0.81 1.17 1.71 2.65 4.76 29.41
Current 1.27 0.48 0.23 32.89 0.84 0.28 0.40 0.48 0.58 0.77 0.93 1.23 1.85 2.40
Deferred 2.51 0.28 0.45 29.64 -2.70 -0.04 -0.04 0.07 0.22 0.40 0.78 1.42 2.90 22.06
1996 7,369 Total 3.85 0.91 0.71 37.91 -5.08 0.21 0.35 0.52 0.76 1.12 1.74 2.79 5.10 30.99
Current 1.27 0.49 0.24 70.54 1.31 0.32 0.41 0.50 0.66 0.78 1.01 1.22 1.83 2.19
Deferred 2.39 0.23 0.52 35.18 -6.39 -0.11 -0.05 0.02 0.10 0.35 0.72 1.57 3.27 24.43
1997 7,419 Total 7.03 1.32 1.07 43.37 -5.15 0.27 0.46 0.71 1.08 1.66 2.52 4.13 7.53 57.21
Current 1.66 0.52 0.26 63.44 1.25 0.30 0.45 0.59 0.75 0.93 1.12 1.73 2.47 2.96
Deferred 5.01 0.48 0.73 43.89 -6.39 -0.04 0.01 0.13 0.33 0.73 1.41 2.40 5.06 46.49
1998 7,668 Total 7.17 0.70 0.89 44.97 -8.48 -0.35 0.20 0.36 0.57 0.90 1.53 2.76 6.01 68.22
Current 2.50 0.52 0.26 49.81 2.40 0.87 0.37 0.44 0.63 0.80 1.08 1.52 2.69 5.31
Deferred 4.06 0.04 0.82 39.00 -10.88 -1.21 -0.17 -0.07 -0.06 0.10 0.45 1.24 3.32 47.94
1999 7,854 Total 8.10 0.72 0.84 59.90 -14.02 -0.28 0.23 0.39 0.59 0.92 1.53 2.87 6.79 82.00
Current 2.49 0.56 0.29 69.50 4.26 0.90 0.36 0.49 0.67 0.95 1.12 1.76 2.68 5.24
Deferred 5.18 0.04 0.78 57.14 -18.28 -1.18 -0.13 -0.10 -0.08 -0.03 0.41 1.12 4.11 65.96
2000 7,295 Total 3.45 1.03 1.07 0.94 -45.49 -0.10 0.30 0.51 0.83 1.32 2.22 4.02 8.27 62.61
Current 4.76 0.60 0.33 65.99 27.54 0.75 0.36 0.66 0.77 1.02 2.42 2.08 3.69 5.74
Deferred -2.38 0.15 1.02 -37.42 -73.03 -0.85 -0.06 -0.15 0.06 0.30 -0.19 1.94 4.58 43.55
2001 7,160 Total -0.71 0.80 0.91 -56.70 -43.23 -0.58 0.24 0.43 0.66 1.01 1.55 2.52 4.50 25.76
Current 2.92 0.58 0.31 87.66 14.38 1.35 0.45 0.51 0.64 0.97 1.16 1.64 2.59 3.59
Deferred -4.25 0.06 0.88 -70.62 -57.61 -1.92 -0.21 -0.08 0.02 0.04 0.39 0.88 1.91 14.13
2002 7,557 Total -2.01 0.54 0.72 -79.08 -41.77 -0.98 0.06 0.28 0.44 0.66 1.00 1.56 2.71 15.93
Current 2.44 0.60 0.31 65.07 11.17 1.37 0.59 0.42 0.55 0.70 1.13 1.61 2.31 3.05
Deferred -4.92 0.00 0.59 -79.03 -52.94 -2.35 -0.53 -0.14 -0.11 -0.03 -0.12 -0.05 0.40 6.66
2003 7,913 Total 5.92 1.70 1.27 -15.68 -4.75 0.40 0.66 0.99 1.43 2.01 2.88 4.30 7.53 43.82
Current 2.38 0.63 0.34 65.53 4.14 0.41 0.57 0.70 0.97 1.13 1.36 1.84 2.80 4.68
Deferred 3.15 0.66 0.71 -55.32 -8.89 -0.01 0.09 0.29 0.46 0.88 1.52 2.46 4.73 30.03
2004 7,902 Total 6.19 1.43 1.17 57.85 -5.46 0.23 0.49 0.80 1.19 1.74 2.55 3.88 6.67 49.77
Current 3.81 0.75 0.42 77.43 11.12 0.54 0.56 0.76 1.00 1.21 1.50 2.13 3.63 9.30
Deferred 2.04 0.34 0.87 -13.08 -16.58 -0.31 -0.07 0.04 0.20 0.53 1.05 1.75 3.04 30.71
2005 6,816 Total 3.34 1.28 1.12 -43.77 -19.31 0.09 0.41 0.70 1.05 1.56 2.35 3.68 6.18 36.70
Current 4.14 0.83 0.47 65.00 13.46 0.68 0.66 0.90 1.24 1.28 6.08 2.39 4.18 7.69
Deferred -1.07 0.17 0.91 -41.97 -32.78 -0.59 -0.25 -0.20 -0.19 0.28 -3.72 1.29 2.00 23.43
2006 5,414 Total 4.95 1.30 1.14 4.79 -14.79 0.09 0.41 0.68 1.05 1.59 2.39 3.82 6.75 47.56
Current 3.72 0.62 0.34 42.22 8.66 0.71 0.61 0.97 1.35 1.41 2.14 2.69 4.56 5.83
Deferred 0.02 0.13 1.01 -26.60 -23.46 -0.63 -0.20 -0.29 -0.30 0.18 0.26 1.13 2.18 21.36
Note: MAD stands for Median Absolute Deviation.
Skewness is the ratio of third moment about to the mean to the standard deviation.
35Table 12: Compensation Across Sectors – Millions of 2005 dollars – All CEOs
Year All Mining Manuf. Transp. Whole Retail FIRE Services
1993 Mean 21.99 5.87 8.41 34.26 11.72 -3.05 22.88 64.81
Median 3.17 3.01 3.19 1.95 4.95 4.85 3.26 5.87
Obs. 715 30 342 112 17 51 92 60
1994 Mean 5.46 -0.00 4.97 -5.27 -2.77 -5.49 1.70 28.25
Median 1.01 0.34 1.58 0.59 0.65 0.12 1.36 2.57
Obs. 1,334 58 592 202 41 107 185 125
1995 Mean 30.77 4.67 20.72 8.52 6.24 13.26 39.04 86.84
Median 3.81 2.47 4.29 1.75 2.25 1.22 9.58 5.16
Obs. 1,401 62 627 208 44 118 183 135
1996 Mean 24.04 9.04 15.98 9.12 6.13 21.40 31.49 82.74
Median 3.56 5.98 3.36 1.34 1.65 4.10 9.72 3.40
Obs. 1,439 65 639 204 43 127 190 146
1997 Mean 53.74 12.12 25.73 43.46 8.68 38.85 63.75 173.07
Median 6.67 1.68 5.79 3.06 3.57 9.12 20.68 6.97
Obs. 1,432 63 655 184 45 129 177 156
1998 Mean 69.78 -9.65 42.37 43.97 7.57 59.51 38.55 199.99
Median 1.68 -2.04 0.97 1.95 1.51 5.34 3.64 5.80
Obs. 1,438 59 652 162 46 128 178 190
1999 Mean 97.87 10.61 35.33 68.21 7.00 26.52 24.01 520.16
Median 1.71 3.11 2.61 1.01 1.32 0.34 -0.97 4.41
Obs. 1,485 62 661 161 51 133 181 210
2000 Mean -12.12 26.94 11.51 -16.55 13.72 -51.30 67.28 -190.04
Median 4.05 7.72 2.47 3.35 2.72 3.44 17.49 2.00
Obs. 1,430 62 629 155 49 130 181 197
2001 Mean -1.67 -14.74 -6.53 1.57 16.72 6.59 76.01 -76.73
Median 2.09 0.15 1.87 1.44 3.94 6.20 2.81 2.53
Obs. 1,396 56 614 145 49 125 180 203
2002 Mean -20.98 5.27 -8.72 -11.22 -4.65 -1.00 -110.76 3.69
Median 0.42 2.47 0.31 0.83 0.19 0.23 1.67 -0.69
Obs. 1,448 57 638 145 48 117 203 214
2003 Mean 35.12 13.37 27.50 33.55 9.68 61.72 42.44 23.58
Median 8.56 5.41 7.71 6.60 3.80 12.03 16.45 9.26
Obs. 1,522 65 654 152 47 125 222 230
2004 Mean 28.56 21.06 24.18 36.27 14.38 6.10 34.47 32.18
Median 6.55 8.06 5.39 5.27 8.10 6.58 10.79 6.08
Obs. 1,517 61 650 155 49 130 217 225
2005 Mean 18.27 42.95 10.88 15.53 12.13 11.38 33.16 24.84
Median 3.90 16.11 2.51 4.01 5.26 6.02 4.82 4.43
Obs. 1,529 58 649 156 50 121 238 224
2006 Mean 46.32 34.70 19.98 63.31 10.32 9.80 35.75 120.15
Median 4.89 3.22 4.16 5.82 4.81 4.65 7.59 4.43
Obs. 1,428 54 617 152 46 118 213 196
Note: Whole stands for Wholesale Trade.
FIRE stands for Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate.
36Table 13: Median Wealth Across Sectors – Millions of 2005 dollars – All CEOs
Year All Mining Manuf. Transp. Whole Retail FIRE Services
1993 Wealth 16.13 9.20 16.69 8.78 9.62 27.80 23.30 22.25
Stock 4.99 2.39 5.36 1.68 4.79 12.47 6.60 9.43
Options 1.38 0.73 1.42 0.40 0.67 1.81 3.32 1.18
1994 Wealth 17.16 8.39 19.25 8.97 14.81 24.00 19.08 23.49
Stock 5.67 2.14 6.58 1.50 3.67 13.17 6.21 7.63
Options 1.75 0.98 1.82 0.41 1.43 1.34 2.84 3.04
1995 Wealth 16.21 9.32 17.91 8.33 12.26 22.12 20.01 23.63
Stock 4.82 2.70 5.06 1.34 3.09 12.19 6.51 6.99
Options 1.53 0.96 1.83 0.21 1.01 1.04 2.26 3.10
1996 Wealth 19.29 12.85 20.38 9.63 14.08 23.32 26.82 26.19
Stock 5.55 2.40 5.91 1.93 4.52 9.71 9.35 6.81
Options 2.57 1.74 2.83 0.58 1.63 0.86 5.04 4.57
1997 Wealth 23.40 16.36 23.39 10.76 14.63 29.56 36.86 28.04
Stock 6.93 3.03 6.61 2.25 5.06 10.06 11.21 11.78
Options 3.72 3.84 3.65 0.84 3.23 2.36 8.09 4.53
1998 Wealth 27.16 18.29 25.16 14.27 20.40 36.59 46.95 35.35
Stock 8.26 4.98 7.22 3.16 6.40 13.61 15.18 11.51
Options 4.99 3.85 4.68 1.70 3.32 4.29 12.09 7.04
1999 Wealth 25.89 11.51 22.79 17.35 18.51 32.37 48.85 33.79
Stock 7.84 2.13 6.39 3.29 7.15 12.54 18.18 12.25
Options 4.21 0.86 3.49 2.39 3.02 3.78 10.97 7.39
2000 Wealth 25.87 12.14 24.83 19.18 20.11 25.54 41.97 42.51
Stock 7.60 1.83 6.55 3.13 6.15 9.27 16.94 11.45
Options 3.70 1.81 3.75 1.69 2.17 2.04 6.50 6.98
2001 Wealth 27.49 20.46 23.54 20.13 20.09 27.53 54.99 34.64
Stock 6.79 5.58 5.68 4.54 5.38 8.03 21.32 7.90
Options 5.05 5.19 4.42 3.39 2.04 4.48 12.17 7.20
2002 Wealth 26.70 17.76 23.06 19.61 20.35 34.03 43.26 31.83
Stock 6.58 3.88 5.38 3.53 4.41 10.10 18.16 6.18
Options 5.25 3.17 4.75 3.38 2.95 7.71 7.83 7.10
2003 Wealth 21.40 18.21 19.19 17.16 15.43 25.69 38.49 20.10
Stock 5.27 4.13 4.51 3.21 4.83 5.00 13.72 4.34
Options 2.89 3.07 2.62 2.10 2.08 3.82 5.16 2.45
2004 Wealth 28.47 23.60 26.89 21.39 22.48 32.28 44.77 27.42
Stock 7.19 6.93 6.32 5.02 7.28 6.10 16.80 6.43
Options 5.62 4.55 5.41 3.15 3.40 7.91 9.22 6.52
2005 Wealth 30.83 28.79 25.94 22.06 26.92 37.83 49.80 28.00
Stock 7.43 7.39 5.71 4.36 7.41 7.39 19.68 6.43
Options 6.38 7.81 5.37 3.31 7.87 8.71 9.20 6.92
2006 Wealth 26.75 40.56 21.82 20.72 23.30 29.02 46.46 25.63
Stock 8.50 12.67 6.60 8.00 5.90 6.86 23.14 7.31
Options 5.93 12.08 4.56 3.01 6.22 7.58 8.06 6.15
Note: Whole stands for Wholesale Trade.
FIRE stands for Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate.
37Table 14: Median Regression Estimates of Pay–Performance Sensitivities
All Executives All CEOs Professional CEOs
Dependent Variables: Total Current Deferred Total Current Deferred Total Current Deferred
Shareholder Gain 6.724 0.859 4.817 34.370 2.573 27.925 21.861 2.000 17.580
( 0.026) ( 0.013) ( 0.014) ( 0.205) ( 0.093) ( 0.149) ( 0.149) ( 0.084) ( 0.101)
Sh Gain   Variance idio -6.662 -0.945 -4.706 -33.211 -2.795 -27.135 -20.547 -2.172 -16.056
( 0.029) ( 0.014) ( 0.016) ( 0.209) ( 0.102) ( 0.163) ( 0.151) ( 0.085) ( 0.102)
Sh Gain   Variance sys 0.390 0.095 0.282 1.025 0.299 1.120 0.311 0.260 -0.172
( 0.011) ( 0.006) ( 0.006) ( 0.036) ( 0.040) ( 0.065) ( 0.022) ( 0.012) ( 0.015)
Number of observations 87,589 88,320 87,589 14,253 14,339 14,253 9,529 9,591 9,529
Pseudo R
2 0.045 0.007 0.033 0.076 0.009 0.063 0.212 0.023 0.176
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis.
Table 15: Median Regression Estimates of Pay–Performance Sensitivities
All Executives All CEOs Professional CEOs
Dependent Variables: Total Current Deferred Total Current Deferred Total Current Deferred
Shareholder Gain 6.897 0.659 5.374 36.866 2.209 31.609 23.550 1.597 19.466
( 0.017) ( 0.009) ( 0.012) ( 0.145) ( 0.056) ( 0.132) ( 0.122) ( 0.052) ( 0.080)
Sh Gain   Variance distrib -2.955 -0.507 -1.996 -11.427 -1.427 -7.457 -8.993 -1.021 -7.271
( 0.018) ( 0.009) ( 0.013) ( 0.157) ( 0.060) ( 0.143) ( 0.133) ( 0.056) ( 0.087)
Variance distrib 1,562.742 1,080.894 171.277 3,917.409 3,598.408 -1,035.553 3,576.366 3,203.788 -258.470
( 23.421) ( 11.244) ( 16.096) ( 197.215) ( 74.491) ( 179.887) ( 177.601) ( 73.906) ( 115.977)
Sh Gain   Sales distrib -4.802 -0.197 -4.085 -32.047 -1.015 -30.434 -17.789 -0.720 -14.738
( 0.007) ( 0.004) ( 0.005) ( 0.067) ( 0.026) ( 0.061) ( 0.058) ( 0.024) ( 0.037)
Sales distrib 530.745 340.554 11.397 605.461 319.166 576.259 1,193.952 598.993 -17.240
( 30.006) ( 13.899) ( 20.622) ( 250.497) ( 91.950) ( 228.469) ( 228.758) ( 93.277) ( 149.336)
Number of observations 103,113 105,103 103,113 16,953 17,182 16,953 11,357 11,489 11,357
Pseudo R
2 0.056 0.021 0.038 0.094 0.023 0.079 0.251 0.063 0.204
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis.
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